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Abstract In a special issue of ‘‘Ethics and Information
Technology’’ (September 2012), various philosophers have
discussed the notion of online friendship. The preferred
framework of analysis was Aristotle’s theory of friendship:
it was argued that online friendships face many obstacles
that hinder them from ever reaching the highest form of
Aristotelian friendship. In this article I aim to offer a dif-
ferent perspective by critically analyzing the arguments
these philosophers use against online friendship. I begin by
isolating the most common arguments these philosophers
use against online friendship and proceed to debunk them
one by one by pointing out inconsistencies and fallacies in
their arguments and, where needed, offering empirical
findings from media and communication studies that offer
a more nuanced view on online friendships. I conclude my
analysis by questioning the correctness of the application
of the Aristotelian theory of friendship by the critics of
online friendship: in my view, the critics are applying the
Aristotelian theory to online friendships in a rather narrow
and limited way. Finally, I conclude my thesis by
proposing that in the rapidly changing online landscape, a
one-size-fits-all application of the Aristotelian theory on
friendship is not sufficient to accurately judge the multitude
of relationships that can exist online and that the various
positive and valuable elements of online friendships should
also be acknowledged and analyzed.
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Introduction
The rise of the Internet and other online communication
technologies has assisted the proliferation of connecting
and creating relationships with people online. Various
philosophers consider these friendships as a poor substi-
tution of friendships in real life. In September 2012, a
special issue of the journal Ethics and Information Tech-
nology was devoted to online friendship. Many of the
philosophers who contributed in the special issue analyzed
online friendship by using Aristotle’s theory of friendship.
They concluded that online friendship cannot reach the
highest level of friendship according to the Aristotelian
model. With this article, I aim to highlight some prob-
lematic aspects of the arguments used by the philosophers
who are viewing online friendships as less valuable. I will
do so by first presenting the main points of the critics of
online friendship as they were laid down in the special
issue; I will then offer my counterpoints and objections
against the arguments used by the critics of online friend-
ship. In ‘‘Using the Aristotelian theory of the good life to
analyze online friendships’’ section I give a short overview
of Aristotle’s theory on friendship and I subsequently
present the main points of the critics of online friendship.
The main point of departure in their analysis is the appli-
cation of the Aristotelian theory on friendship. The most
common conclusion is that despite several positive aspects,
friendships that exist purely online cannot achieve the
highest level of Aristotelian friendship. I go on in ‘‘Identity
construction online and multiple communication filters:
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arguments and counterarguments, Loss of the ‘shared life’
between online friends: arguments and counterarguments
and ‘Settling’ for less valuable forms of friendship online:
arguments and counterarguments’’ sections to counteract
the previously presented arguments against online friend-
ship; my point-by-point analysis concludes on ‘‘Question-
ing the application of the Aristotelian framework on online
friendships’’ section with questioning the correctness of the
application of the Aristotelian theory of friendship by the
critics of online friendship. In my view, the critics are
applying the Aristotelian theory of friendship to online
friendships in a rather narrow and limited way. In this way,
the possible positive elements of online friendships are
deemed as less significant than offline friendships. Finally,
I conclude my thesis by proposing the following: the online
landscape is rapidly changing, and it includes various
communication mediums and platforms with differing aims
and scopes. In such a landscape, a one-size-fits-all appli-
cation of the Aristotelian theory on friendship is not suf-
ficient to accurately judge the multitude of often deep and
meaningful personal relationships that can exist online. It is
thus necessary that the various positive and valuable ele-
ments of online friendships are also acknowledged and
analyzed.
Using the Aristotelian theory of the good life
to analyze online friendships
Aristotle’s theory of the good life and in particular, his
analysis of the role that friendships play in achieving
human flourishing, has been one of the most influential and
long-lasting theories on human connections and friend-
ships. Aristotle considers philia (friendship) as an essential
component of ‘the good life’: in friendship, friends love
‘‘the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful’’ [NE
VIII.2: 1155b, 19].1 Friends are defined as people who
‘‘must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and
wishing well to each other’’ [NE VIII.2: 1156a, 4–5].
Friendships of utility are based on certain advantages or
goods that one can attain from one’s friend; for example,
having a friend who has professional connections that we
can profit from, or a friend who lavishes us with expensive
gifts. Friendships of pleasure are friendships where the
main motivation for continuing the friendship is the plea-
sure we get from our friend’s company; for example, a
friendship where two friends share a love of history books
or enjoy playing chess together. The third kind of friend-
ship, virtue friendship, is based on mutual admiration of
our friend’s character and sharing of the same values.
Aristotle considers virtue friendship as the highest form of
friendship between two people; unlike the first two kinds of
friendships which are more based on self-interest, virtue
friendship is based on ‘mutual concern of each person for
the other for his own sake’ (Bowden 1997, p. 65). It is
considered to be the most durable kind of friendship, since
it is not affected by external and instrumental factors. For
example, we might lose interest in our friend if he stops
buying us expensive gifts, or the intensity of the friendship
with our chess-playing friend might lessen if he becomes
much more interested in solving puzzle words rather than
playing chess with us. However, a virtuous friend loves us
for our character and belief in similar moral values.
In recent years, friendships between individuals do not
only take place in the usual venues of everyday life, but
have increasingly begun to be formed online. People can
meet each other on the Internet in various ways: through
social networking sites such as Facebook, through online
games such as World of Warcraft or through online com-
munities. Often, the interaction between two individuals
online can become frequent and intense, with exchange of
very personal details and stories, as well as a heightened
sense of connection and understanding (Henderson and
Gilding 2004).
However, the moral value of such friendships has been
called into question by some philosophers; they seem to
doubt whether a friendship sustained exclusively over the
Internet, with no real life interaction could be still classified
as ‘real’ friendship and reach the level of virtue friendship,
i.e. the highest level of friendship according to the Aris-
totelian theory. While it is mostly agreed that online
friendships can possibly reach the level of utility or plea-
sure friendship, several philosophers argue that a true vir-
tue friendship cannot be reached purely online. This has
been argued by various scholars in the special issue of the
journal Ethics and Information Technology on online
friendship (September 2012). The Aristotelian theory of
friendship is the preferred tool with which these scholars
compare and contrast online friendships with real-life,
offline ones. While these philosophers do recognize that
certain benefits can be derived from online friendship, they
nevertheless conclude that those benefits are of an instru-
mental nature; they pertain much more to the lower types
of Aristotelian friendship such as utility and pleasure
friendships. According to their application of the Aris-
totelian theory, virtue friendship, the highest form of
friendship, is indeed viewed as impossible to achieve
online, due to the following three reasons: (1) selected
presentation of oneself online which can prevent us from
truly knowing our friend’s character, (2) the multiple filters
in communication online that can lead to distortion and loss
of important clues, as well as the inability to engage in
many different activities with our online friend, (3)




skepticism regarding the way that the Internet and espe-
cially social networking sites tend to shape how we interact
and relate to one another. It is considered troubling that
young people in particular might be satisfied with the kind
of fast-paced and shortened contact that is characteristic of
social networking sites. Such a development is thought to
lead young people away from developing friendships that
correspond with the Aristotelian ideal. This could mean
that young people could be missing out on the possibility of
becoming fully-developed virtuous individuals.
I do agree that by the very nature and characteristics of
the Internet as a communication medium, friendships cre-
ated and maintained online have their own special set of
challenges and downsides. I understand that such chal-
lenges could potentially impede the full development of a
meaningful friendship online. However, the critics are
decrying the possibility of a higher level of friendship
existing online by using offline friendships as the ‘natural’
way of things. My own analysis of their arguments aims to
highlight certain inconsistencies and fallacies. I also
maintain that broad generalizations about online friendship
do not necessarily apply for all the vast array of commu-
nication platforms online (social networking sites, online
games, online communities etc.); each communication
platform offers and allows different modes of communi-
cation and interaction between users. Below, I will first
present and then counter-analyze the arguments offered
previously against online friendship.
Identity construction online and multiple
communication filters: arguments
and counterarguments
One of the biggest points of contention for philosophers
regarding online friendships is the possibility that persons
online might (either intentionally or unintentionally) be
less forthcoming with revealing their character, thoughts
and beliefs in their entirety. In their view, people online
may choose to reveal the aspects of themselves that they
consider most positive (thus hiding away less positive traits
and ideas). Another possibility is that, even if a person
online truly believes that he is totally honest and open
about presenting himself in a way that reveals his true self
to others, that this might actually not be the case, due to the
many filters of communication online. For example,
McFall (2012) describes two different types of communi-
cation filters that pervade our communication with others:
there is multi-filtered communication and single-filtered
communication. In multi-filtered communication, person A
relays information to person B after having filtered the
events through her own interpretation (which could mean
that the way the information is relayed can be factually
incorrect). Single filtered communication occurs when
person B has direct access to person A’s experiences
(perhaps because person B and person A were physically
together when an experience occurred); thus, the infor-
mation passes no (potentially obscuring) filter. McFall then
goes on to explain the importance of single-filtered com-
munication in truly getting to know our friend’s character
and moral value. His conclusion is that single-filtered
communication is difficult to achieve with the available
technological tools online. So, by the very nature of online
interactions, friendships of virtue cannot be achieved
online.
This view is also shared by Cocking et al. (2012), who
note that the many limitations and barriers inherent to
online interaction can be a hindrance in really getting to
know the character of our online companion. They make
the argument that ‘‘what is prone to be missed or distorted
are various aspects of ourselves about which we do not
approve, or we think are not notable or we simply do not
notice’’ (p. 181). Cocking et al. also express concerns about
the increasing prevalence of friendship online among
teenagers and young people. They make the remark that the
Internet gives people the opportunity to construct their
image as they see fit (e.g. perhaps by portraying themselves
in a very positive light). This unprecedented control of
presenting oneself can be very appealing to young people,
who are in the process of constructing their own identity.
This feature can also give young people the idea that not
only can they carefully create their (public) image and
identity ‘in their own terms’, but that they can also begin to
‘‘think about these connections to others solely in terms of
their choices and control.’’ (p. 183). This development is in
discordance with the Aristotelian ideal of the perfect
friendship, where the moral development of both friends is
informed by their mutual understanding and appreciation
of the other person’s virtues. Additionally, Cocking et al.
note that especially for young people who use social net-
working sites, it is particularly attractive to highlight their
best aspects and embellish their interests while obscuring
their less positive sides. Young people are already in a
stage where they explore their own identity and the ways
they can relate to others, and Cocking et al. claim that by
using social networking sites, they can create a very ide-
alized and highly fine-tuned version of themselves.
However, what regularly happens in social networking
sites is that social network users have people in their net-
work who they also know offline. Having people present on
your circle of friends on Facebook, whom you also know
offline, can limit or mitigate the identity construction effect.
It is quite possible that offline friends will recognize an
attempt of their friend to create a more positive, or alto-
gether different, image than what she really is and bring the
matter to her attention. Let’s take the example of a young
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teenage girl who decides to present a more refined image on
Facebook by claiming she is very fond of Jane Austen
novels. Such a claim would not go unnoticed by her offline
friends, who know that she actually has never read any of
the works of Jane Austen. They could make public com-
ments wondering when exactly she has started reading Jane
Austen books; in this way, they could bring to everybody’s
attention that their friend’s claim is in fact false.
This particular characteristic of social media is also
important when it comes to analyzing the way teenagers
use social media. Often the profile information they pro-
vide is wildly inaccurate, like stating that they live in Ulan
Bator, Mongolia, when they actually live in Boston, USA.
This is, however, a way for them to inject humor and wit
into their online self-presentation and represents no actual
effort of presenting a whole new image. Boyd, in her book
‘‘It’s complicated: the social lives on networked teens’’
(2014), has conducted an eight-year-long ethnographic
research on teenagers’ internet and social media use in the
United States. She mentions the example of 16-year-old
Michael, who sees no reason to put up accurate information
on his social media profile, since ‘‘all my [social media]
friends are actually my friends; they’ll know if I’m joking
around or not’’ (p. 46). Boyd goes to note that most teen-
agers ‘‘aren’t enacting an imagined identity in a virtual
world. Instead, they’re simply refusing to play by the rules
of self-presentation as defined by these sites. They see no
reason to provide accurate information, in part because
they know that most people who are reading what they post
already know who they are. […] Teens don’t see social
media as a virtual space in which they must choose to be
themselves or create an alternate ego. They see social
media as a place to gather with friends while balancing
privacy and safety with humor and image.’’ (pp. 46–47). It
seems thus that teenagers have found ways to navigate
through the (implicit or explicit) rules and behavioral
expectations of social media and are appropriating them as
a tool for connection and exploration.
Especially nowadays, connecting to others online offers
more points of reference and ways in which individuals
can obtain information about their online friend. This
holds true not only for those friendship which exist both
online and offline, but also for the so-called ‘purely’
online friendships. For example, on Facebook it is com-
mon for users to create profiles using their real name and
photograph. If one makes a friend on Facebook, he can
use this information in order to find out more about their
new connection, i.e. by looking up their name on an
online search engine. This can reveal more relevant
information, such as a personal website, a LinkedIn or
Twitter profile or a Skype account. This means that more
aspects of a person’s life are available online: their pro-
fessional career, their love of camping or even their
political preferences. In this way, the previous division
between purely online and offline friendships seems to
fade, since in the past, we often had zero access to our
online friend’s life and beliefs and had to rely exclusively
on the information they provided us. Nowadays, the great
amount of information that we can find about our online
friends can assist in minimizing the effects of selective
self-presentation.
It can even be argued that social media and their use can
have positive effects towards minimizing the knowledge
problem as presented by Cocking et al. (2012). For
example, Elder (2014) makes a good point about how the
multitude of information about persons online can actually
help, rather than hinder, our overall assessment of them:
‘‘online, conversations leave digital ‘‘paper trails’’, making
it easier to cross-check stories and consider a person’s
comments in light of the overall picture of their character
presented by their online presence. For example, the person
who expresses one view on social issues to you, but whose
Facebook wall is full of posts and memes to the contrary,
gives grounds for an overall assessment of character which
takes the totality of evidence into consideration’’ (p. 292).
A similar point about the possible trustworthiness of online
acquaintances is made by Turilli et al. (2010); they opine
that ‘‘online identity can be diachronic and the history of
the performances associated with that specific online
identity can be recorded and made available. In this way it
is possible to establish the reputation of an online identity
without the need to also associate such a reputation to a
specific physical individual.’’ (p. 338) One can thus make
the point that in this way, our online presence can be
consistent and reliable: our online friends can see the many
aspects of our personality and how these evolve through
time.
Returning to social media, the ‘mutual friends’’ function
of Facebook can be used as an informal ‘‘reference’’ for
those who wish to make online friends with people they
don’t know, but wish to have an extra measure of relia-
bility. Let’s assume you receive an invitation to connect on
Facebook from ‘‘Peter’’. You notice that ‘‘Peter’’, whom
you don’t know offline, is also Facebook friends with your
offline friend ‘‘John’’. If you wonder whether you should
add Peter to your Facebook friends’ list, you could ask
John to give you more information about him. Since John
knows Peter in real life, this can become a ‘‘stamp of
approval’’; Peter can be trusted, even though you have
never met him personally. This is the online equivalent of
meeting someone through mutual friends: you find it easier
to trust them precisely because of your mutual friends, who
have the informal function of ‘‘quality assurance’’. If you
are friends with someone, you usually know their positive




Precisely because of the proliferation of social media, it
has become more commonplace to quickly exchange
e-mail addresses, or send Facebook or LinkedIn invitations
to connect with people we have just met offline. Quite
often, we only know this new person in a superficial way
and we have not had the time to get to know them in depth.
For example, information about marital status, political and
religious beliefs, studies and other interests are often not
mentioned during the first stages of getting to know
someone offline. Yet, through social media, it becomes
easier to have more information about our offline
acquaintances, and thus, we can obtain a more ‘‘complete’’
idea of who they are at the click of a button; their two
sisters and one brother, their love for Joy Division, their
exchange semester in Dublin during their Master’s studies,
or their Ph.D. degree from Boston University—all these
information are at our disposal. Who you are (or present
yourself to be) online can have direct consequences for
your offline life. This could help in the ‘‘screening’’ pro-
cess, if we for example have met a new acquaintance at our
painting group: he is pleasant and funny and we look for-
ward to get to know him better. If however, once we add
him on Facebook, we see that his wall is filled with sexist
and homophobic posts, and he seems to be unapologetic
about it, this might make us reconsider the option of
deepening our relationship with him. In fact, it is possible
that what we reveal in our online profiles can actually be
used to find information that we have carefully hidden in
our offline lives. This is becoming common practice for
many who are dating. Often, their search in the social
media profiles of their date provides them with an
unpleasant surprise, such as finding out that the person they
are dating is already in a relationship, as it happened to a
22-year old woman in the UK.2 So one could potentially
argue that while it is indeed an issue that our online pres-
ence could have distorting effects on our offline lives, in
some cases it is actually possible that our online presence is
revealing information that could correct our distorted of-
fline presentation.
It is true that the phenomenon of refining of the self,
(including selective presentation of only our best points, or
a construction of a different identity altogether) still can
and does happen online; especially in environments where
one is completely anonymous, such as chat-rooms. How-
ever, it is clear that we are moving away from the era of
nicknames and avatars and the sort of ‘‘pseydonimity’’ they
awarded, and towards a digital environment where all kinds
of information about us are readily available. These
information can offer a far more wholesome picture of our
preferences, likes, dislikes and beliefs. Especially in social
networking sites, the presence of offline friends and their
comments or reactions can rectify the possible voluntary
distortion of presenting oneself. These new developments
in the online landscape present us with new opportunities.
The information we can get from social media can be used
to counteract the previous lack of knowledge about our
online relationships.
Similarly to the points made by Cocking et al. (2012),
Fro¨ding and Peterson (2012) argue that the technological
features available in online communication make it very
easy for online users to have a great amount of control
regarding the time, frequency and duration of interactions.
To them, this is a problematic point because, ‘‘they [the
users] can (even unintentionally) choose to communicate
only in certain situations. The price they pay is that they
miss out on important, potentially problematic and com-
plex, aspects of the friends’ personality. Therefore the
agent ends up admiring and loving parts of the friend rather
than the whole of her.’’ (p. 205). When it comes to the issue
of distorted self-presentation online, they provide a con-
structed example of two online friends, Alice and Betty.
Alice and Betty have been interacting online for a long
time and they have created a close bond. Alice would like
to meet Betty in real life as well, but Betty is vague and
dismissive, which hurts Alice’s feelings. When Alice goes
to the local swimming pool, she happens to see Betty there
as well, recognizing her from photographs they have
shared. Betty is doing physiotherapy with the help of a
trainer, since she has been involved in an accident and thus
is now physically disabled. Alice was not aware of this
fact, since Betty, not wanting to be viewed by her friend as
‘different’, chose to not disclose this fact. Fro¨ding and
Peterson conclude that the friendship between Alice and
Betty cannot be a true friendship of virtue, since ‘‘complete
and excellent friendship can only obtain when both agents
are fine, noble and excellent in every aspect, and this is
incompatible with the withholding or manipulation of rel-
evant information’’ (p. 205). By using this example,
Peterson and Fro¨ding reach the conclusion that by not
knowing this important fact about her friend Betty, Alice
did not have all the necessary information needed in order
to make a correct evaluation of her friend; her judgment of
Betty’s character was thus ill-founded. Alice’s admiration
and care for Betty were not based on the truth, hence, their
friendship cannot attain the highest Aristotelian level.
However, one could wonder whether knowing that your
online friend is disabled or not has any bearing on their
moral character—why finding out that your online friend is
disabled should mean that the friendship has lost part of its
moral significance? While one could stress the importance
of honesty, especially in a relationship between friends, it
is a fact that in everyday life, many factors about ourselves
could affect the way others think about us. Our profession,
2 http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manche
ster-news/facebook-pippa-mckinney-post-girlfriend-10199577.
Using Aristotle’s theory of friendship to classify online friendships: a critical… 69
123
our sex, our race, our formal education (or lack thereof),
our possible disability are all factors that can define our
identity and more importantly, the way others perceive us
and relate to us. This aspect of human behavior is rather
pervasive and it explains the huge appeal the Internet
offers: online you are not defined by your appearance, your
financial situation or your illness. Your contribution to
discussions and interactions online is judged on merit—a
surgeon can be on equal footing with a janitor. As
McKenna et al. (2002) observe, ‘‘there are aspects of the
Internet that enable partners to get past the usual obstacles
or ‘gates’ that in traditional interaction settings often pre-
vent potentially rewarding relationships from getting off
the ground’’ (p. 10).
Regarding people with disability, who might experience
people treating them differently in real life (perhaps they
feel people pity them or that they are too quick to agree
with them in order to not hurt their feelings), the Internet
offers them the opportunity to socialize and express
themselves without being defined by their handicap, eth-
nicity or social status. Coming back to the example of
Alice and Betty, Bu¨low and Felix (2014) offer an inter-
esting point of view: in the offline world, Alice and Betty
are not on equal footing. Unlike Alice, who has freedom of
movement and has thus many opportunities to socialize and
make friends, Betty’s physical impairment makes it diffi-
cult for her to visit restaurants, cinema’s etc. and meet new
people. Added to this is Betty’s own embarrassment about
her handicap. However, ‘‘ Betty is not hindered by her
impairment when she is interacting online; here, her
morally good character shines through. This allows her to
communicate more openly and wholeheartedly than is
possible when she is interacting physically. Her commu-
nication and interaction online can go pass prejudices or
assumptions about her impairment. […] Online Betty may
come to foster her moral character in her interaction with
Alice—only here can they mirror each other on an equal
footing.’’ (p. 12) In other words, the Internet becomes a
‘‘leveling field’’ factor; it enables people who would be
unequals offline to be able to interact in equal terms with
each other online.
This aspect of the Internet, I dare claim, is actually a
positive one, since it gives people coming from less
privileged positions the chance to participate equally in
the online world and create connections based not on
aspects of themselves they have no control about, but on
the strength of their personality and character. Suler
(2004) makes the point that, ‘‘the traditional Internet
philosophy holds that everyone is an equal, that the pur-
pose of the net is to share ideas and resources among
peers. […] Even if people do know something about an
authority figure’s offline status and power, that elevated
position may have less of an effect on the person’s online
presence and influence. In many environments on the
Internet, everyone has an equal opportunity to voice him
or herself.’’ (p. 324) Similarly, research conducted by
Chan and Cheng (2004) on the quality of online versus
offline friendships, concluded that online friendships
between men and women were considered to have a
higher quality than offline friendships. It can be argued
that the physical distance between the two friends helps
mitigate specific issues that might arise from offline cross-
sex relationships, such as unwanted sexual attraction. In
other words, the Internet could have a positive influence
in friendship development between the sexes. Chang and
Chen’s research also covers the development and the
proliferation of online cross-cultural friendships. The
results show that the typical cultural differences and
misunderstandings present in offline settings are actually
less pronounced online, making online cross-cultural
friendships easier to develop. One could thus make the
tentative point that the Internet, precisely because of the
built-in limitations of distance and lack of physical fea-
tures can foster valuable relationships of equals between
people who would not as easily been able to become
friends offline.
Briggle (2008) makes an interesting point regarding the
contrast of offline and online friendships. He claims that
offline friendships too can be constrictive and limiting in
their capability to allow us to fully express our self, our
personality and motivations to another person. As he notes,
offline friendships occur within complex webs of
relations and social structures. These webs are
freighted with demands of status, norms, expecta-
tions, and conventions that shape the nature of
friendships. Friends are more or less consciously
squeezed into various compromises by the structure
of this overarching social ecology. It can be hard,
then, to really ‘‘be myself’’ within any space that this
web affords. There may be a secret or deeper self that
is unable to emerge as we must enact in our daily
lives (p. 74)
He uses the example of an accountant who does not feel
really comfortable in any of her life-environments; under-
lying currents and expectations, past events and attitudes
create boundaries for her self-expression: she cannot truly
‘‘be herself’’ at her work environment and neither is that
possible in her volleyball team and in her poetry club. Such
embedded distortions being at play in offline relationships
can be offset by the distance of online relationships, where,
precisely because there is no pre-existing web of relation-
ships and social obligations, an individual can feel free to
openly express aspects of themselves that they ‘‘file away’’




The point that Briggle makes is a point worth pondering:
many of the arguments used to explain why certain aspects
of online friendships are problematic could also be said for
offline friendships. Even with our closest offline friends,
there are times when we choose not to share certain
information about ourselves, either because we feel they do
not need to know or because perhaps we are afraid of their
judgment. Also, quite often, friends made in different
environments get to see different aspect of our personhood,
or as Cocking (2008) writes, they see these ‘‘plural aspects
of self’’ (p. 127), but not a completed whole: friends from
work might know us as serious and calm, while friends
from our student years might know us as daring and with a
peculiar sense of humor.
In fact, the internet might allow us with more possibil-
ities to express our ‘‘true selves’’. In research conducted by
McKenna et al. (2002), it was discovered that individuals
who suffer from social anxiety, shyness or a lack of social
skills, reported that they felt that they could express their
‘‘true’’ selves better online, and as a result, were able to
form close and meaningful relationships with people they
met online. Similar results about the better expression of
our ‘‘true self’’ online were also reported by Bargh et al.
(2002). McKenna, Green and Gleason also measured the
durability of these relationships by contacting the survey
respondents 2 years after the initial data collection and
asked them about the present status of their previously
reported online friendships and relationships: the majority
of those relationships were found to be still intact 2 years
later. It is thus conceivable to argue that precisely due to
the absence of common ‘‘gating’’ features that could
otherwise halt the development of a relationship offline, the
Internet offers individuals the possibility to express their
true selves in a more wholesome way and so, they are able
to create lasting relationships which may otherwise be
impossible to obtain.
Loss of the ‘shared life’ between online friends:
arguments and counterarguments
Another concern arises from the apparent absence of ‘a
shared life’ between online friends. For Aristotle, sharing
the same experiences, in number, kind and diversity, is an
essential component for people who are friends of virtue, in
order to further develop morally. This is shared by McFall
(2012), who claims that friendships of virtue cannot
flourish online, since character friends (as he refers to
friends of virtue) need to live together. He argues that
virtue friendships cannot be created and sustained entirely
through technological meditation because of the lack of
shared activities with our friend that would help us in truly
getting to know their character and thus, to share our moral
development. He quotes Aristotle in the kind of activities
character friends share together: drinking, playing dice,
practicing a sport or studying philosophy together—by
sharing these activities, moral development between
friends can occur. Although McFall does acknowledge that
many of the activities Aristotle mentions can now be
shared online, he maintains that even so, these online
friendships with shared activities can only be utility or
pleasure friendships, since ‘‘one thing that character-
friends provide for each other, an opportunity for robust
moral reflection and improvement of the self and other,
cannot be transferred as easily through technological
means’’ (p. 222). Fro¨ding and Peterson (2012) subscribe to
this view as well, by claiming that friendships of virtue
cannot be sustained exclusively online and even the most
intense kind of online relationship must always be paired
with significant interaction offline. According to their
analysis of the Aristotelian theory of the good life, a shared
life between friends is superior and it is far better for the
quality of the friendship if the two friends partake together
in a plethora of activities. As they note, ‘‘two persons that
spend time together in real life are more likely to face a
wider spectrum of different situations, and consequently,
encounter a larger range of topics meriting contemplation.
[…]. In real life we stumble on situations that are both
novel and unexpected and we have to deal with them in
promptu. This seldom happens on the internet.’’ (p. 204).
Sharp (2012) similarly stresses the importance of pro-
longed offline contact between friends as a robust way to
truly become familiar with our friend’s character, while
stressing that ‘‘we must be able to perceive the other person
in a full, rich way, and he or she must be able to perceive us
as well. This creates the necessary bond, one that will allow
the fullest communication of feelings and goals, with the
least ability to fool the other person or hide our vices.’’ (p.
239). Without actively sharing our lives, our sorrows and
moments of triumph, our beliefs and weaknesses with our
friend, our friendship cannot reach the highest Aristotelian
level of friendship.
However, in a case study, Munn (2012) presents the
possibility of friendship in the immersive virtual worlds of
Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games
(MMORPGs), with the very popular online game World of
Warcraft used as the prime example. Munn makes the case
that such online games provide ample opportunities for
players to participate together in the same activity (e.g.
grouping together to fight against an enemy group or
retrieving a valuable amulet). During those shared activi-
ties together, people have the possibility to communicate
and coordinate their actions via various channels, whether
these are internal channels provided by the game, or
external channels, organized by the players themselves
(e.g. through external webpages where the players can
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communicate or by using Ventrilo, a voice-over internet
program for communication of large groups online). By
grouping together and sharing the same activity of pursuing
a common goal,
those in the group demonstrate their character, their
roles and desires, and it becomes apparent to the other
members of the group whether or not the prerequi-
sites for friendship are present. […] Similarly, over
an extended period of participation in this shared
virtual activity, the group will grow closer as friends,
and improve themselves in terms of in game ability,
and in general skills such as coordination, co-opera-
tion and patience. (p. 7).
Of course, it is important to note that even the most
advanced MMORPG’s cannot offer a full sensory experi-
ence to their players (for example, the senses of smell and
touch cannot be transmitted online), nor is it possible to
experience the innumerable range of possible social
situations and interactions online. Nevertheless,
MMPORG’s such as Second Life offer a more compre-
hensive amount of possible activities, such as going to
restaurants, opening stores, driving and joining various
clubs. As Bu¨low and Felix (2014) comment, ‘‘the more
possibilities there are, the more possibilities individuals
have to engage in shared activities in a wide range of
areas.’’ (p. 10) In this way, friendships that occur in the
space of an immersive virtual world have an increased
potential to eventually satisfy the Aristotelian criterion of
shared activity as a necessary condition for friendship
development. Additionally, research by Cole and Griffiths
(2007) has showed that MMORPG’s are in fact highly
social games, with a high number of players reporting that
they have made ‘‘life-long friends and even partners’’ (p.
582) through the game. These results could indicate that
MMPORG’s do have the potential to offer their players
opportunities for robust friendships and very important
intimate relationships.
It is remarkable to note that the philosophers who insist
on the importance of the ‘shared life’ for the development
of virtue friendship, do agree on the positive role the
Internet can play in maintaining friendships that have
started offline but due to various factors have to be largely
conducted online. One might ask: why is there this divide
in stance regarding using the Internet to maintain a (pre-
viously) offline friendship and a purely online one? A
possible reply to this question could be that friendships that
started offline but due to time and circumstance are now
taking largely place online, have nevertheless been founded
on spending time offline with our friend, sharing different
activities and getting to really know their character. Since
the goodness of our friend’s character has been established
in real life, it is not difficult for these friendships to be
maintained online, if so needed. There could indeed be a
distinction between simply maintaining and actually
establishing a friendship through technological means.
However, such an argument is again based on the pre-
sumption that physical proximity is a necessary condition
for the development of virtue friendship.
Indeed, sharing experiences with our friends can deepen
our bond and enhance our knowledge of their character.
However, I would like to argue that spending time being
physically together is not per se a necessary condition for
the development of virtue friendships online. It is quite
possible that deep and frequent exchanges of a personal
nature online, with the two friends being open to honest
self-disclosure about past events, present occurrences and
future aspirations, coupled with shared activity online, (e.g.
playing chess online, taking virtual museum tours together,
listen to music together while sharing our emotional and
aesthetic response to it) can still offset the lack of physical
activities together in the offline world. Online friends can
share their daily activities in great detail, from the mundane
details of daily lunch to the special experience of becoming
promoted or taking a rescue puppy home. They use tech-
nological media in order to make each other witness of
important events, e.g. by making a webcam connection
during a friend’s graduation ceremony or birthday party.
By participating in online activities together, and especially
in activities with a strong element of play (such as online
games), the two online friends can encounter many dif-
ferent situations and gauge each other’s reactions to novel
experiences.
This particular view of the shared life between friends is
supported by philosophers who offer an alternative inter-
pretation of the Aristotelian shared life argument. Liu
(2010) in her analysis of the ‘‘living together with friends’’
Aristotelian point, argues that ‘‘ Aristotle associates living
together with conversing and sharing thoughts (…) he
identifies it with sharing our favorite activities’’ (p. 593) In
other words, one could sufficiently argue that the main
characteristic of friends’ shared lives is discussion and the
sharing of thoughts. This point is further expanded to the
online realm by Bu¨low and Felix (2014), who argue that
‘‘the idea that the most excellent activity friends can
engage in is theoria, i.e., pure speculation. If one wants to,
one can focus on doing theoria together when online.’’ (p.
11) They go on to point out that Aristotle was not too
particular about where friends share their activities, as long
as it gives them the feeling that they are living together in
the way they themselves find most appropriate. The amount
of activities that are possible online is constantly growing
and offering for many robust opportunities for friends to
spend time together. Their closing argument is, ‘‘ seeing as
it is possible to engage online even in theoria, the highest
sense of human activity according to Aristotle, why should
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he not have accepted such an online relation as a perfect
friendship? (p. 11).
Elder (2014) also makes a similar point: namely, that
friends share life through discussion and rational thought.
Wondering whether friends who love philosophy can dis-
cuss about it in social media and whether photography
lovers can share and discuss each other’s photographs
online, she comes to the conclusion that this is indeed
possible: ‘‘Sharing a conversation about one’s day with a
friend should count as living together, for Aristotelians, if
we are to take his comments on the nature of the shared life
seriously. Friends need not be present for every life event
in order to share in a life: they needn’t be grazing in the
same field, like cattle’’. (p. 289) This is in reference to
Aristotle’s claim that sharing of discussion and thought is
what sharing a life together means for men, ‘‘and not, as in
the case of cattle, feeding in the same place’’ [NE IX.10:
1170b, 12–13] Finally, Wittkower (2012) in his analysis of
communication and friendship on Facebook, he opines that
Facebook actually is ‘‘a remarkably well-suited platform
for the activity of friendship ‘‘ (p. 25) due to the multitude
of opportunities it offers for contact, communication,
games and sharing between its members. These elements
allow ‘‘the long-distance elements of friendship to become
not a mere sharing of information about activities engaged
in separately, but an active asynchronous sharing of
activities themselves’’. (p. 25) We can thus conclude that,
when it comes to the feasibility of sharing our lives with
our online friends, the Internet with its various platforms
and modes of communication can offer us viable alterna-
tives for experiencing and sharing our lives with those we
hold dear.
‘Settling’ for less valuable forms of friendship
online: arguments and counterarguments
The third point of philosophers that view online friendship
as a lesser form of friendship, namely, that pursuing such
friendships online can be detrimental to our development
as virtuous individuals, is one that deserves closer inspec-
tion and analysis. For the philosophers that uphold virtue
friendship as the ideal form of friendship and maintain that
virtue friendship is impossible to achieve online, the huge
increase and development of online friendships can be seen
as a disturbing trend. If people are ‘settling’’ for the lesser
forms of friendship that are, according to these philoso-
phers, indeed possible to achieve online (such as utility and
pleasure friendship), then it is possible that they will not be
motivated to make friendships of a higher value. As McFall
(2012) states, ‘‘We may choose friendships as we please,
but we should at least be aware of the highest form, lest we
unknowingly mistake what we have for the highest’’ (p.
230). Similar warnings are given by Sharp (2012) who
warns that pursuing friendship mostly or exclusively
online, especially when using social networking sites, can
lead to a more superficial kind of friendship. He makes the
point that especially young people, who are still learning
how to connect with others, seem to be taken by the many
opportunities to create friendships online, citing a discus-
sion with students where most of them believed they had
close friends according to the Aristotelian definition. His
analysis of this phenomenon is that we may ‘‘believe we
have such friends, often because we conflate closeness with
the sort of connection Aristotle has in mind. They are not
the same, but even if they were, how would we find the
time to get so close to one individual when we are moni-
toring the statuses and updates of so many people?’’ (p.
236). Sharp finds this a disturbing trend, especially since
young people could mistake fleeting news updates with a
true sense of friendship. His observations pertain to the
nature and function of many social networking sites, on
which one can have hundreds of friends whose lives one
can follow by checking on their status updates; however,
this is not conductive to building a virtue friendship, since
such a friendship needs prolonged and intense interaction
in order to build up trust and a sense of connection. He
concludes his argument by stating, ‘‘If, as I believe, online
friendships face significant obstacles in reaching the kind
of consummate friendship that Aristotle discusses, and if
the possibility of such a level of friendship is an important
tool for realizing virtues, then our propensity to develop
our friendships largely or solely online could be damaging
our ability to develop as fully virtuous members of soci-
ety’’ (p. 231).
Such assertions, although coming from a genuine place
of concern, are still unnecessarily framing the issue in more
simplistic terms. Online friendship becomes a cautionary
tale, a hurdle to leading a virtuous life, an inferior
replacement of tried and true friendship ‘‘in real life’’. Is
online friendship really such a cause for concern? Let us
provide a closer examination of such claims.
Continuing with Sharp, he states that ‘‘unfortunately,
our ability to empathize with other people may already be
diminishing from our increased tendency to communicate
with other people more indirectly’’ (p. 237). As a defense
of his argument, he offers research conducted by Konrath
et al. (2011), which examined dispositional empathy on a
sample of 72 American college students. The results
showed that the ability for feeling empathic concern has
dropped in the past decade. According to Sharp this is
supposed to be due to the massive use of social media since
this period. However, analyzing the original study presents
us with a more complex view. The study is limited to only
US nationals and only people of a certain age category,
namely college students, making this not the most
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representative sample for a presumed reduction in empathy
worldwide, as alluded by Sharp. Furthermore, this decrease
in empathy is potentially attributed by Konrath et al. (2011)
to different factors, including a rise of narcissism in young
people, a societal focus and pressure for success, changes
in media and technology and changing family practices.
The link between the use of internet and social media and
the reduction of empathy seems to be at best speculative,
since the researchers only hypothesize between the rise of
online media and changes in interpersonal dynamics: no
concrete data that communicating with people online does
reduce empathetic disposition is offered.
Poignantly, Sharp himself also acknowledges that
internet use seems to be only one out of many possible
factors responsible for this decline in empathy. However,
he seems to not take into account that there has been
empirical research examining the expression of empathy
online, whose findings are not congruent with his claim that
our empathetic abilities could be compromised from
communicating with others online. For example, Preece
and Ghozati (2001) have analyzed 100 different online
communities and concluded that expression of empathy is
common online, especially in communities where the focus
is on patient support or emotional support. Such findings
have been offered by other researchers as well, who report
that especially in health communities, there is a very high
level of emotional expression, empathy and understanding
between the community members (Lamberg 2003; Siri-
araya et al. 2011; Kaliarnta et al. 2011). Thus, empirical
research does not seem to support the claim that online
communication can inhibit our empathetic disposition.
Sharp’s final point is that ‘‘the advent of Twitter and the
desire for smaller, tighter status updates have led us to
peruse the lives of others in brief snippets rather than
seeking a deeper connection’’ (p. 238). However, this
rather crude generalization seems to exclude the possibility
that such short updates can still function as a way for
people in our network to get to know more details about us,
our daily life, our thoughts and ideas; thus, by knowing
more information about us, they might choose to intensify
their relationship with us. A recent study by Steijn and
Schouten (2013) investigated the relationship between
sharing personal information and relationship development
in the context of social networking sites in the Netherlands.
Their results indicated that sharing of personal information
on social networking sites (SNSs) correlated strongly with
a positive influence on our relationships with other mem-
bers of one’s network. More specifically, Steijn and
Schouten found that on SNS’s, relationships between
friends and acquaintances (weak ties) were more likely to
develop than relationship with close friends and family
(strong ties) and that such a relationship development could
be beneficial. They offered an explanation for this by
arguing that due to lack of time and resources, maintaining
many relationships through one-to-one contact is difficult
and most of our news and information are shared with our
closest friends and family members. When sharing our
news publicly on an SNS, acquaintances and friends get
more information than they normally would, which could
make our relationship with these ‘weak ties’ more strong.
As such, short updates on social networking sites can and
do offer the possibility for a strengthening of ties between a
user and his acquaintances or distant friends. Similar
results were reported by Lange (2007) about a research
conducted on creating, sharing and commenting of videos
on YouTube videos. Lange found that ‘‘new media can
function as a catalyst that helps facilitate social interaction
at the local level. Specifically, it can strengthen weak ties
and activate (…) social network ties that have the technical
ability to interact but lie dormant prior to the introduction
of new media into the social group.’’ (pp. 1–2) Going back
to Steijn and Schouten (2013), they also found that those
who share more information on their profile report less
frequently than others that there has been a decrease in
relationship trust and intimacy. Steijn and Schouten opine
that this may occur since the more information someone
provides about himself, the more his online connections
can form a complete picture of his likes and personality and
thus avoid disappointment or incidents of misinterpreta-
tion. In other words, sharing more information about our-
selves in social networks makes for more positive
relationship development with our friends and
acquaintances.
Similar points as those by Sharp (2012) are raised by
Cocking et al. (2012): they wonder whether the limits and
distortions of online interactions are now seeping in and
negatively affecting offline relationships, especially when
it comes to young people who have grown up making full
use of the Internet: ‘‘if, like many teenagers today we
increasingly grow up online, then we will be especially
vulnerable to taking on or adapting to the conception, in
this case of friendship, with which we are presented by our
social environment’’ (p. 183). They offer the common
example of teenagers having hundreds of friends on social
media and they make the assertion that it is possible that
many teenagers might actually believe that they have
hundreds of ‘true’ friends, or alternatively, that teenagers
constantly add new people on their online social network
since it is seen as ‘cool’ to have so many friends and they
would not want to appear left out.
It is true that the majority of young people and adoles-
cents nowadays are very active online in various social
networking sites and do have a great number of friends on
these social media; however, this does not necessarily
mean that teenagers assume that all the people in their
online network are their friends. Boyd (2006) has
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conducted ethnographic research on social networking
sites. Her data suggest that social network users tend to
interpret the meaning of the word ‘friend’ (as used in a
social networking site to denote someone you have added
on your network) in a much broader sense. A ‘friend’ on a
social networking site can be anything from a family
member, a close friend, a colleague, a classmate, a
neighbor, or someone you do not know yet—and social
media users seem to be keenly aware of the distinction
between all these categories, even when they are all
lumped together under the moniker of ‘friends’.
One thus must take care to not confuse ‘Facebook
friendships’ (a large part of which are offline relationship
which just get transferred into an online environment) with
purely online friendships, where people have never met in
real life. Various researchers which have conducted
empirical studies on the use of social networking sites
(Boyd 2014; Zinoviev and Duong 2009; Lampe et al. 2006;
Lenhart and Madden 2007) have come to the conclusion
that social networking sites are used primarily for
strengthening relationships with offline friends and/or
reestablishing connections with people from our past—
meeting new people online seems to be a secondary goal.
Thus, one could argue that the example of friendships in
social networking sites cannot be used to claim that online
friendships in general are not as valuable, since in the
majority of cases, friendships on social media are offline
friendships with an online component, with purely online
friendships (that is, friendships between people who have
never met in real life) as a minority. At the very least, we
can claim that this remains an open question.
Returning to the point about teenagers being especially
sensitive to the possible degradation of the value of
friendship due to social media, Boyd’s work on the
appropriation of the Internet and social media by teenagers
offers some illuminating perspectives. Social media has
taken the role that previously, real-life places like the mall
or the neighborhood cafe´ had: they offer teenagers a place
to ‘‘hang out’’ as it were—they act as a supplement of face-
to-face interaction, not as a replacement. Additionally, due
to the increasingly fast-paced lifestyles, social media afford
teenagers with the opportunity to keep in touch with those
they care about but due to time constraints cannot spend
enough time physically. Boyd closes her book by opining
that ‘‘ networked publics are here to stay. Rather than
resisting technology or fearing what might happen if youth
embrace social media, adults should help youth develop the
skills and perspective to productively navigate the com-
plications brought about by living in networked publics.’’
(p. 213). In a similar vein, Schols (2015) has conducted
sociological research on the Internet use and social cohe-
sion of adolescents in the Netherlands. She has concluded
that ‘‘adolescents’ everyday Internet use does not inhibit
their connectivity with others in their offline world, but
instead promotes the relationships with their social ties and
their social inclusion’’ (p. 158). Furthermore, Schols
remarks that too much attention is given to the possible
negative outcomes of teenage Internet use and calls for
more research focused on the positive outcomes of teen-
ager Internet use and how these positive outcomes can be
brought about.
These empirical research results indicate that the effect
of social media in the lives of teenagers might not be as
negative as previously thought. Teenagers still spend time
with friends, still try to make sense of themselves and their
place in the world; the factor that has changed is that these
activities now also take place online—however, without
displacing the offline relationships teenagers have, but
complimenting them in ways.
Regarding the issue of conflating online friendships with
the ‘higher’ form of friendship, Fro¨ding and Peterson
(2012) take an even more radical stand by comparing
online friendship with certain controversial forms of
alternative medicine: just like an alternative medicine can
end up poisoning instead of healing, so can a person’s
online friendships lead him to disillusionment and isolation
instead of providing him with robust and meaningful
companionship. They compare and contrast the connec-
tions one makes through an online professional networking
site to the relationships formed through social networking
sites. On professional networking sites, both parties have
clear benefits from the relationship they develop and they
are both aware that this is a professional relationship and
not a friendship, thus professional networking sites do
allow for mutually beneficial (albeit instrumental) rela-
tionships. On social networking sites however, some users
might believe that by connecting to others through these
sites, they are likely to gain genuine and meaningful
friendships, when that is not always the case. They offer
the constructed example of two women, Alice and
Daniella, who are Facebook friends and communicate
often. Alice spends a lot of time gardening and posting
pictures of her garden online, and is very glad to receive
Daniella’s compliments about her beautiful garden. How-
ever, Daniella’s sole purpose of befriending Alice is to get
tips and tricks about gardening, so that she can tend better
to her own garden. In this example, Alice is mistaken about
the nature of her friendship with Daniella since she is not
aware of Daniella’s hidden agenda, so this online friend-
ship not only has no moral value but it could also be
harmful to Alice. So, for Peterson and Fro¨ding, social
networking sites cannot even meet the criteria for offering
the ‘lesser’ forms of friendship. They claim that, unlike the
users of business networking sites who have a clear
understanding about the type and benefits of the relation-
ships they develop, ‘‘the promise of the social network
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sites rings more hollow. Here the user is made to believe
that she is likely to gain genuine friends and form mean-
ingful and deep social relationships with other people’’ (p.
206).
However, their argument is problematic for two reasons:
first, as we saw earlier, a large part of people who use
online networking sites do so primarily in order to stay
connected with friends they already know offline, and not
so much for meeting new people online. This particular use
seems to be supported by Facebook itself: in the Facebook
‘Help’ page, the question ‘How to add friends on Face-
book’ is answered by offering two possibilities: searching
for friends by typing their names or email addresses in the
search bar, or by importing your e-mail contacts.3 In
another page of the ‘‘Help’’ section, it is emphasized that
Facebook users should only send friend requests to people
they know personally.4 Also, empirical studies conducted
show that only an estimated 30 % of Facebook users add
people they don’t know as their friends, with the majority
of users preferring to add family members, friends and
acquaintances that they already know offline to their net-
work of Facebook friends (Jones and Soltren, 2005).5 Thus,
taking the above evidence into account, we can see that it is
clear that at least in the case of one (and arguably, currently
the biggest) social networking site, which is Facebook, the
emphasis falls on connecting with already existing (close)
friends and the users thus are not mislead. Secondly, the
example Fro¨ding and Peterson offer is rather poorly con-
structed and most definitely not limited to online friend-
ships: relationships where one of the two parties has
ulterior motives unbeknownst to the other person can also
occur frequently offline. Yet, the possibility that we could
be fooled does not stop us from connecting and creating
friendships offline. As Elder (2014) observes, ‘‘If the
potential for deception in real life is not sufficient to rule
out the possibility of friendship, neither should it be con-
sidered especially hazardous to online friendship’’(p. 292).
Similarly, Bu¨low and Felix (2014) point out that ‘‘all kinds
of direct and indirect communication between people are
potentially non-genuine. That is the risk one faces when
involving oneself in relationships with other people, online
or offline.’’ (p. 8). In other words, although healthy caution
should always be advised when entering a relationship,
whether online or offline, the possibility of getting mislead
online does not appear to be significantly higher than in
offline settings.
Questioning the application of the Aristotelian
framework on online friendships
As such, it is clear that the arguments of the critics of online
friendship can be rebutted: often the objections presented by
the critics can be overturned with providing empirical evi-
dence which points to the contrary. Many of the critics are
actually implying various empirical claims without making
this explicit, and offer no (or only partial or erroneously
interpreted) empirical data. This concerns for example,
Sharp’s claims of reduced empathy online or the Fro¨ding and
Peterson claim that social networking sites can be as dam-
aging as some kinds of alternative medicine. It is thus
important that such claims are properly scrutinized and,
where possible, empirical evidence should be presented as a
way to support or counteract these claims. Of course, in the
widely diverse selection of online environments and plat-
forms, it is indeed possible that even empirical studies might
not be in agreement with one another regarding the benefits
or risks of online interactions. However, as Søraker (2012a)
states, this only shows that such a question regarding online
friendship is ‘‘immensely complex (…) [and] inherently
context sensitive and different for each individual’’ (p. 213).
Also, the different authors are unclear about defining the
characteristics of online friendship and the means of com-
munication between online friends are not fully specified.
Are online friends completely anonymous or not? Are online
friends those that have a friendship through e-mail? Or are
they those who have a friendship through social networking
sites or online games? Is the mode of interaction between
online friends text-only or are voice and/or video online
programs also used? Do they also have offline interaction or
are they only discussing friendships that purely take place
online? Without one clearly marked definition of online
friendship, it could very well be that many of the philoso-
phers are criticizing different things and their arguments
possibly do not hold water for online friendships which do
not fit their own particular definition.
However, a bigger point of contention is the rather
narrow application of the Aristotelian framework on
friendship by the critics of online friendship. One could
argue that Aristotle’s theory, while indeed being a bench-
mark theory regarding friendship and its importance on
human flourishing, is nonetheless rather arbitrarily used in
order to judge a a phenomenon (online friendships) that did
not exist in the era Aristotle lived; No one could ever
proclaim to know for sure that Aristotle, had he be living in
our time, would be against the possibility of virtue
friendships online. For example, the requirement for
friends to spend physically time together was an absolute
necessity in Aristotle’s time, since two friends that were





5 More empirical information confirming this has already been cited
in pages 20–21 of this article.
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each other, nor could they experience new things together.
Nowadays, this something that is possible, with the help of
the internet and its various applications (Baym 2010; Boyd
2014; Bu¨low and Felix 2014; Elder 2014; Wittkower
2012).
More importantly, other philosophers such as Elder
(2014) have used the Aristotelian theory of friendship in
order to claim the opposite: that social media actually can
facilitate the development of virtue friendships online.
Elder argues that social media actually preserve important
human values such as playfulness, exchange of ideas and
reasoning. She then engages with six objections regarding
the possibility of social media to offer places where
friendships can flourish: these are objections regarding
superficiality, privacy, physicality, deceptiveness, com-
mercialism and poverty of communication. After refuting
these objections, Elder concludes that ‘‘Rather than fear
social media as a threat to genuine friendship, we should
consider how it can be used to foster an important good, by
considering it in the context of the shared life characteristic
of the best friendships.’’ (p. 292).
Elder’s contribution to the debate regarding the possi-
bility that virtue friendships can be realized online, signi-
fies an important point: depending on its application, the
Aristotelian framework can be used by some philosophers
to claim that virtue friendships cannot be attained online,
but other philosophers can apply it in a way that proves the
opposite. In other words, one could make the argument that
there is yet no definitive answer to the question whether
online friendships can achieve the highest virtue level. If
anything, this division of opinions could indicate that true
virtue friendships are indeed possible to occur online, yet
they are, just like in the offline world, rare. This possibility
deserves closer examination, both philosophically and
empirically.
Finally, it is worthwhile to again summarize some of the
features that currently dominate the online landscape. The
purely online friendships, where we had no direct con-
nection to our friend’s offline life, are beginning to fade. As
long as we know our online friend’s name, we can find
their Facebook profile, their Twitter feed, we can add them
on Skype so that we can see and hear each other. We can
thus have a far more complete picture of who they are,
even without ever meeting them. One then has to wonder
how much weight the critics’ argument about distorted
presentation and lack of direct knowledge actually has
under these circumstances. On the other hand, it is now
commonplace to add our offline friends into our social
media connections; this in turn blends our online and off-
line lives in a way that was uncommon in the early days of
the internet. It would be useful if the critics could explain
in more detail how this mingling of the online and the
offline world could have deleterious effects, as they have
previously suggested. Furthermore, the lack of ‘‘gating’’
features online has the effect that people connect with each
other without having external factors like their age, gender,
profession, race, disability etc. raise barriers between them
and their friend. So it could be argued that these ‘‘limits’’
can actually promote the development of worthy friend-
ships rather than hinder them.
More importantly, our increasingly mobile lifestyles
present us with new friendship styles and opportunities.
What about the people we meet briefly offline (say, at a
conference or during holidays) and then connect and con-
tinue our contact online? We can argue that these rela-
tionships, even though they started in the offline world, are
still extremely superficial, since the time and familiarity
required for the development of friendship are absent in
these cases. However, due to the possibility to deepen these
relationship through contact via social media, emails or
Skype, these connections could become deep and mean-
ingful. Where would these friendships fall under? Are they
online friendships, offline friendships that continue online
(doubtful, given that due to the brevity of our offline
contact, we could not speak yet of a friendship), or are they
a new kind of hybrid relationship, the kind that could only
exist and develop through the possibilities the Internet and
social media offer? Wittkower (2012) also makes a valu-
able point about how Facebook can help resurrect friend-
ships that have faded due to distance and time. All these
opportunities for communication and friendship are affor-
ded online, and it is important that we do not diminish their
value.
Finally, even we were to concede to the online friend-
ships critics that online friendships indeed are not virtue
friendship ‘proper’, they still can be of invaluable worth for
the people who have them. Søraker (2012b) mentions that
there has been an ‘‘axiological turn’’ (p. 18) following the
realization that technology often changes our lives radi-
cally without any direct right-or wrongdoing. As a way to
better consider the multiple implications of technological
change, he introduces the term ‘‘prudential’’, which ‘‘refers
to something that is valuable for someone, contrasted with
something that may be good in itself (if there is such a
thing) or something that is good for something (which
would typically be an instrumental value)’’(p. 19). This is
an important distinction because it moves away from the
division between instrumental and intrinsic value by add-
ing yet another dimension. I do believe and argue that
online friendships can have great prudential value for the
individuals involved. As Baym (2010) concludes, ‘‘ These
relationships make important contributions to people’s
lives […] pairs who do become closer interact through
multiple media, eventually making the influence of the
internet difficult to conceptually distinguish from the many
other influences on their partnership. […] over time people
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can reveal themselves to one another verbally and non-
verbally until they form understandings of one another as
rich as, or richer than, those they hold of people they meet
in any other way’’. (p. 131) Let us thus keep an open mind
about the potential value and contribution of online
friendships in our lives as virtual human beings.
Conclusion
In our current day and age, when large parts of human activity
take place online, it is a natural consequence that people can
and will connect with others on the Internet. In the ever-
changing landscape of the Internet, there are various com-
munication platforms and methods that are continuously
evolving and allowing us to have more information about our
friends; we can use programs that actually allow us a far more
interactive mode of communication with our online friends.
Such connections can be very personal, deep and meaningful
for the individuals concerned, providing companionship, a
listening ear in times of need, intellectual discussion and
stimulation. Dismissing such friendships as ‘a lesser’ kind by
rigidly applying the Aristotelian theory of friendship to a
mode of interaction and connection that was simply
unthinkable in Aristotle’s time is doing such friendships a
disservice and tends to view technology’s contribution to
human connections and flourishing in a rather negative light. I
propose that it is indeed necessary that greater attention should
be paid to the positive sides and benefits of online friendships
in a systematic way that takes into account the unique char-
acteristics that online friendships have, and what could these
kinds of friendships mean for our flourishing and well-being.
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